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A heuristic for theory development in physics is to draw formal analogies to theories applied in different 
physical domains. Perhaps the first use of this strategy in the history of physics was William Thomson’s 
use of formal analogies to Fourier’s theory of heat in his development of a mathematical theory of 
electrostatics in the 1840s. Since then, there have been many examples in which formal analogies have 
been the basis for developing a theory in one physical domain by applying a mathematical framework 
articulated in the context of a theory applied in a different physical domain. This paper will consider the 
example of analogies to theories of low-temperature superconductors in solid state physics that were 
the basis for the development of the Higgs model in particle physics in the 1960s. I will briefly argue that 
the development of electromagnetism by Thomson and James Clerk Maxwell (among others) in the 
nineteenth century and the development of the Higgs model in the twentieth century are both 
examples of the successful application of the heuristic strategy of drawing formal analogies to theories 
in different physical domains. I will focus on two respects in which this illuminates the Higgs model case 
study: (1) the analogy with superconductivity does not supply a physical interpretation for the Higgs 
field or the Higgs boson in the same way that the analogies with theories of fluids and mechanical 
systems did not underwrite a physical interpretation of a luminferous ether in electromagnetism, and 
(2) formal analogies were useful in developing both electromagnetism and the Higgs model because 
physicists lacked physical intuitions about the subject matter of the theories. The electromagnetism case 
study is better understood than the Higgs model case study, in part because historical distance allows 
philosophers, historians, and physicists the benefit of hindsight and because there has been more 
opportunity for analysis. This is why integrated HPS is a fruitful approach to understanding the Higgs 
model.  
 
Maxwell’s investigations of electromagnetism leading up to his formulation of Maxwell’s equations were 
inspired by Thomson’s analogies. His early work on electromagnetism introduced a model of an 
incompressible fluid ([1856] 1890, 155); in later work he developed a mechanical model for 
electromagnetism that employs molecular vortices in an ether connected by idle wheels ([1861] 1890, 
[1873] 1954). Maxwell did not believe any of these models accurately represented the mechanism for 
the production of electromagnetic phenomena, but he did take his models to be a sort of proof of 
concept’ that there is some mechanical model that represents the production of electromagnetic 
phenomena (Maxwell [1873] 1954, 416-7; Harman 1998, 118-9). Similarly, when contemporary 
physicists are pressed to explain the Higgs mechanism to their students or the general public they often 
rely on analogies to a condensed matter system (e.g., Miller 1993). The historical basis for these 
explanations is the analogies to models of superconductivity that introduced spontaneous symmetry 
breaking into particle physics. The order parameter in models of superconductivity is the analogue of 
the order parameter in the Higgs model. The analogue of the Higgs field is the condensate wave 
function, which represents the collection of superconducting electrons. Based on an analysis of physical 
disanalogies, I argue that the same conclusion we reached about the physical interpretation of 
electromagnetism also applies to the physical interpretation of the Higgs mechanism: we should not 
invest the successful formal analogies with physical significance. There is no mechanical ether; the Higgs 
field is not the same kind of entity as a collection of superconducting electrons and the W and Z bosons 
do not acquire mass by a similar physical mechanism to the gain of effective mass in superconductors. 
 
If one inclines towards one of many variants of scientific realism, one might worry that the success of 
formal analogies is inexplicable if they are not underwritten by physical analogies. In the course of 
presenting his early model of the force as lines of incompressible fluid, Maxwell offers the following 
insight: The substance here treated of...is not even a hypothetical fluid which is introduced to explain 
actual phenomena. It is merely a collection of imaginary properties which may be employed for 
establishing certain theorems in pure mathematics in a way more intelligible to many minds and more 
applicable to physical problems than that in which algebraic symbols alone are used. ([1856] 1890, 160) 
 
This insight also applies to the Higgs model case study. Formal analogies to superconductivity were 
useful because solid state physicists had a much clearer physical interpretation of the physics underlying 
superconductivity phenomenology than particle physicists did of that underlying particle 
phenomenology. Having an intuitive picture that goes along with a mathematical formalism can aid with 
manipulating the mathematical formalism. Ultimately, the intuitive fluid and mechanical models were 
abandoned, but the lessons about the abstract Maxwell equations were retained. Similarly, the intuitive 
picture of the physical processes in superconductivity is inapplicable to particle physics, but was still 
helpful in enabling physicists to grasp the range of consequences of the mathematical formalism (e.g., 
the possibility of massive gauge bosons). 
 
